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IS YOUR SPOUSE TAPING YOUR TELEPHONE
CALLS?: TITLE III AND INTERSPOUSAL
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Scott J. Glick *
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
prohibits the intentional interception of any telephone conversation2 without
the consent 3 of one of the parties to the conversation.4 Although wiretap-
ping' evokes images of the Watergate scandal or commercial espionage, ap-
proximately 68 percent of all reported wiretapping matters involve one
spouse's attempt to obtain evidence for use against the other spouse. 6 De-
spite the prevalence of interspousal electronic surveillance, Title III fails to
directly address the issue of whether such wiretapping activities are legal.
The absence of an explicit statutory directive has given rise to the question of
whether an implied interspousal immunity exception7 exists in Title III,
thereby rendering the electronic surveillance legal.
* Mr. Glick is a trial attorney in the Criminal Division of the United States Department
of Justice. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Justice Department. The author wishes to thank James S. Reynolds for
his contributions to this Article, and Vic Stone and Paula A. Wolff, for their review of an
earlier draft of this Article.
1. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2521 (1968))[hereinafter Title III].
2. A telephone conversation is a "wire" communication. See infra note 50.
3. See infra note 52.
4. See infra note 53.
5. The terms "wiretapping" and "electronic surveillance" are used interchangeably in
this Article.
6. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELAT-
ING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 160
(1976) [hereinafter NWC REPORT]. "Another 11 percent were the result of other domestic
surveillance, including parental and courtship eavesdropping." Id.
7. "Interspousal immunity" refers to the legal doctrine whereby an otherwise valid law-
suit between two parties is invalidated solely as a result of their relationship as husband and
wife. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66, at 144-45 (Edward
W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (explaining the common law and statutory background of inter-
spousal immunity); William E. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L.
REV. 303 (1959) (addressing the question of interspousal immunity in tort actions between
spouses). See generally Adena J. Adler, Note, Husband and Wife-Interspousal Immunity for
Intentional Torts is Unconstitutionally Irrational-Moran v. Buyer, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 709 (1985)
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During the last two decades, the federal circuit courts of appeals' and the
federal district courts9 have engaged in a sharp debate over whether the
prohibitions in Title III extend to interspousal electronic surveillance.'o The
resolution of this debate may have significant and wide-ranging legal conse-
(discussing that the Illinois statute allowing interspousal immunity in tort actions violates
equal protection).
8. Compare Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the
interspousal immunity doctrine applies where wiretaps are used between spouses in prepara-
tion for a divorce action) and Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.) (holding that the
interspousal immunity doctrine applies where a wife seeks civil damages against a husband for
wiretaps in the marital home), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974) with Platt v. Platt, 951 F.2d
159 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the interspousal immunity doctrine does not apply to Title
III actions) and Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that the interspousal
immunity doctrine does not apply to interspousal wiretapping in the marital home), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992) and Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the interspousal immunity doctrine does not apply to wiretapping the marital home) and
Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (same) and United States v. Jones, 542
F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that the interspousal immunity doctrine does not apply
irrespective of whether the wiretap was placed by a spouse or a third party). Cf White v.
Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the interspousal immunity doctrine does
not extend to private detectives, even though the wiretapping was instigated by one spouse
against the other); United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979) (same).
9. Compare Nations. v. Nations, 670 F. Supp. 1432 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (holding that the
interspousal immunity doctrine does not apply in a civil action by one spouse against another
alleging wiretapping in the marital home) and Flynn v. Flynn, 560 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio
1983) (same) and Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same) and Citron
v. Citron, 539 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting defendant spouse's motion to dismiss
for lack of intent to violate the law or reckless disregard of the legal obligations necessary for a
Title III action), aff'd, 772 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984) and Gill
v. Willer, 482 F. Supp. 776 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the interspousal immunity doctrine
does not apply in a Title III action alleging wiretapping within the marital home) and Kratz v.
Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (same) and Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp.
898 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that the interspousal immunity doctrine does not apply) with
Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that the interspousal immunity
doctrine applies in a Title III action where one spouse installs a telephone recording device in
the marital home without the other spouse's knowledge or consent) and Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F.
Supp. 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (same) and London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(same), aff'd sub. nom, Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 677.
10. State courts have also grappled with this issue. Compare Robinson v. Robinson, 499
So. 2d 152 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (admitting as evidence telephone taping done within the mari-
tal home in the course of a marital dispute and applying the interspousal immunity doctrine)
and Baumrind v. Ewing, 279 S.E.2d 359 (S.C.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) with
People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1992) (refusing to admit as evidence in a criminal murder
case, telephone conversations between the victim's wife and her lover, finding that the calls
were unlawfully recorded under federal wiretapping statute) and State v. Jock, 404 A.2d 518
(Del. Super. Ct. 1979) (stating that the interspousal immunity doctrine does not apply in a
wiretap prosecution) and Burgess v. Burgess, 447 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1984) (finding that Title III
provides an exception to the interspousal immunity doctrine).
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quences. Prosecutors may risk losing the only evidence of a serious crime,'"
individuals engaging in such wiretapping may face felony convictions, 12 and
attorneys who use the illegally intercepted telephone conversations may be
subject to disciplinary proceedings.1
3
This Article examines the issue of whether an implied interspousal immu-
nity exception exists in Title III. Part I provides a context for the analysis
by discussing the traditional approach taken by courts in interpreting stat-
utes: that is, where courts consider the plain meaning of the text of the
statute and then consider its legislative history to determine whether the
plain meaning should be superseded by contradictory legislative history.
Part II applies the traditional approach of statutory construction to Title
III and concludes that neither the plain meaning of the text of Title III nor
its legislative history support the existence of an implied interspousal immu-
nity exception. Indeed, an examination of the entire legislative history of
Title III, some of which has been ignored by those courts which have carved
out an implied interspousal immunity exception, clearly demonstrates that
Congress specifically intended to prohibit all electronic surveillance, includ-
ing interspousal electronic surveillance, and specifically rejected a predeces-
sor bill because it failed to prohibit such conduct.
Part III examines several policy considerations which undermine applica-
tion of the interspousal immunity exception to Title III, including personal
privacy concerns. Finally, this Article concludes that an implied inter-
spousal immunity exception in Title III does not and should not exist, and
that the creation of such an exception by the courts represents misapplied,
extralegal policy making.
11. See People v. Otto, 277 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 831 P.2d 1178 (Cal.
1992). In Otto, the State of California sought to introduce a secretly recorded telephone con-
versation into evidence in a murder conspiracy trial. The tape was made by a husband to
confirm his suspicions that his wife was involved with another man. In addition to confirming
the husband's suspicions, the tapes contained evidence that the wife and her lover were plot-
ting the husband's murder. The trial court admitted the tapes into evidence and the jury
convicted the wife and her lover. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions,
obviously influenced by the realization that the practical effect of finding that an implied inter-
spousal immunity exception did not exist in Title III, would have been to deprive the State of
crucial evidence, without which, the convicted murderers would have been set free. Id. at 607.
The decision by the California Court of Appeal in Otto exemplifies Justice Holmes' maxim that
"hard cases make bad law." Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). The California Supreme Court, however, concluded that there was no
implied interspousal immunity exception in Title III and reversed the appellate court's deci-
sion. Otto, 831 P.2d at 1178.
12. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976) (rejecting an interspousal
immunity exception to the federal wiretapping statute and making the spouse chargeable with
a criminal offense).
13. See In re Wuliger, 583 N.E.2d 1317 (Ohio 1992); Gunter v. Virginia State Bar, 385
S.E.2d 597 (Va. 1989).
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I. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The "traditional approach" 14 to statutory interpretation requires courts to
begin their inquiry by first examining the text of the statute. As the Supreme
Court recently stated, "[t]he task of resolving the dispute over the meaning
of [a statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language
of the statute itself."' 5 Under this approach, the plain meaning of the text
governs the interpretation of the statute when the language of the statute is
unambiguous.' 6 The plain meaning is derived from the court's examination
of the "natural reading of the phrase" at issue and the "grammatical struc-
ture of the statute."' 7 Where "the statute's language is plain, the 'sole func-
tion of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.' "18 Thus, when
Congress has expressed itself in "reasonably plain terms, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."' 9
On many occasions, however, the Supreme Court has taken a broader
view of its role and sought to effectuate the original intent and purpose of the
Congress that enacted the statute. The Court's more expansive view has
lead some commentators to describe the Court's traditional approach as the
" 'soft' plain meaning rule." 20 Under the soft plain meaning rule, the plain-
est of meaning can be "trumped" by contradictory legislative history.2' The
Supreme Court has described these situations as "rare cases [in which] the
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds
14. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 624 (1990).
15. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (citing Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)); accord Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430
(1981).
16. Eskridge, supra note 14, at 626-27.
17. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 241.
18. Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). See Caminetti,
242 U.S. at 485 ("Where the language [of a statute] is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion."). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2, at 75-76 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing interpretation of criminal statutes).
19. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (quoting Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); accord Connecticut
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) ("[Clourts must presume that a legisla-
ture says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what is says ... .
20. Eskridge, supra note 14, at 626.
21. Id.; see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (While the "ordinary and
obvious meaning of the phrase is not to be lightly discounted," the Court will look to legisla-
tive history to be certain that it did not misread the legislature's intent.); Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978) (engaging in a lengthy "examination of the lan-
guage, history, and structure of the legislation" to determine what "Congress intended"), see
also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 448 (1989) (stating that the
court searches for "evidence of congressional intent" only when the plain meaning of the stat-
ute yields an "odd result").
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with the intention of its drafters." 22 In such circumstances, "the intention of
the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls."23
Leading commentators preferring competing theories of statutory inter-
pretation have challenged the traditional or soft plain meaning approach.24
Indeed, recently there has been a challenge from within the Supreme Court
itself. In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,2 5 Justice
Scalia criticized26 the Court for examining the legislative history of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act2 7 to confirm or rebut the plain meaning of
the statute. In Justice Scalia's view, it was "ill-advised" for the Court to
deviate from giving "effect" to the express language of the statute, because
the result was not "a patent absurdity."2 In many opinions since Cardoza-
Fonseca, Justice Scalia has continued to advance what one leading commen-
22. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571; accord Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S. Ct. 599, 604 (1991)
("When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare
and exceptional circumstances.").
23. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). However, some com-
mentators and courts have pointed out that divining the intentions of the drafters may be
difficult because the legislative record almost never reveals why a vote was cast or what the
legislator's understanding of the bill actually was. See William N. Eskridge & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 326 (1990).
They argue:
To talk about the "intent" of the legislature, as that term is normally used, multiplies
the[ ] difficulties, because we must ascribe an intention not only to individuals, but to
a sizeable group of individuals-indeed, to two different groups of people (the House
and the Senate) whose views we only know from the historical record.
Id.; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 353
n.5 (1989) (noting that the traditional approach which is guided by legislative history, presup-
poses that the courts are capable of discovering the collective intent of the enacting Congress);
see also Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279
(1985) ("The discussion of legislative intention is complicated by the fact that we must deal
with a group of persons, each of whom may have different intentions."); cf. Kratz v. Kratz,
477 F. Supp. 463, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (observing that the legislative history is "at best an
imprecise barometer of congressional intent").
24. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 23, at 324; Zeppos, supra note 23, at 355; Frank
H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48 (1983); Jonathan R. Ma-
cey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 233 (1986); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 430 (1989) (noting that while "it is
proper to look at a statute's background in the form of actually enacted and repealed provi-
sions, the legislative history, which was never enacted, should rarely be permitted to supplant
the statutory words as they are ordinarily understood"); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 216-17 (1980) (asserting that the adopt-
ers of the Constitution may have contemplated broad interpretation to accommodate a chang-
ing society).
25. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
26. Id. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1992).
28. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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tator terms "the new textualism 29 theory of statutory interpretation.3 °
Under this theory, "once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain mean-
ing, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant .... [The mean-
ing of a statute is confirmed] from [an] examination of the structure of the
statute, interpretations given similar statutory provisions, and [the] canons
of statutory construction."
31
Recently it appeared as though Justice Scalia had convinced a majority of
the Supreme Court to accept his methodology of statutory interpretation
32
and not to consider the legislative history of a statute. In West Virginia
University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,33 at issue was the interpretation of the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.34 In an opinion authored by Jus-
tice Scalia, the Court stated:
[t]he best evidence [to be examined] is the statutory text adopted
by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President.
Where that contains a phrase that is unambiguous-that has a
clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and judicial practice-
we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements
of individual legislators or committees during the course of the en-
actment process.35
Justice Scalia's view, however, has not been accepted by the majority.
Two months after West Virginia University Hospitals was decided, a majority
of the Court retreated significantly from an exclusive analysis of the text of
the statute. In Chisom v. Roemer,36 the Court interpreted certain terms in
the Voting Rights Act of 19653' after considering what the "intent [of] Con-
29. Eskridge, supra note 14, at 623.
30. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371-77 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring); United States
v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281, 318-29 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Thompson
v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619,
640-44 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. Eskridge, supra note 14, at 623-624.
32. Justice Scalia relies, in part, on the same theory of statutory interpretation postulated
by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote that "[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant;
we ask only what the statute means." Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,
12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899); see Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1992).
35. West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1147.
36. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1992).
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gress would have" been if the issue had been presented to the enacting Con-
gress.38 Justice Scalia's sharp dissent stated:
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the
meaning of language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning
of the language in its textual context; and second, using established
canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication
that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies.
If not-and especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning
appears plain-we apply that ordinary meaning. Today, however,
the Court adopts a method quite out of accord with that usual
practice.39
The debate within the Supreme Court has continued into this past term.
In Connecticut National Bank v. Germain," at issue was the interpretation
of the statute which governs the jurisdictional basis of appeals from the
Bankruptcy Court.4' Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, stated that
the:
canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help
courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a
statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon
before all others. We have stated time and time again that courts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute
are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: "judicial
inquiry is complete."42
The majority in Connecticut National Bank concluded that the inquiry was
"complete" after an examination of the plain meaning of the text of the stat-
ute. Four members of the Court, however, while concurring in the judg-
ment, concluded that an examination of the legislative history was equally as
important. Justice Stevens stated in his concurring opinion that "[w]henever
there is some uncertainty about the meaning of a statute, it is prudent to
examine its legislative history."4 3 Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurring
38. Chisom, Ill S. Ct. at 2367.
39. Id. at 2369 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See also Dewsnup v. Timm, 112
S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Almost point for point, today's opinion is the
methodological antithesis of Ron Pair-and I have the greatest sympathy for the Courts of
Appeals who must predict which manner of statutory construction we shall use for the next
... case.").
40. 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158, 1291, 1292 (date).
42. Connecticut Nat'! Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 1149 (citations omitted) (quoting Rubin v.
United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)); accord United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514
(1974) (stating that the underlying presumption is that "Congress meant what it said").
43. Connecticut Nat'! Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 1150 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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opinion, in which Justices White and Blackmum concurred, stating that it
was also important to examine what "Congress probably did not intend."
44
Based on the Court's decision in Connecticut National Bank, it would ap-
pear that the debate within the Court is far from resolved. However, regard-
less of which theory of statutory interpretation is utilized, the result with
respect to the correct interpretation of Title III is the same: an examination
of both the plain meaning and the legislative history of the statute leads to
the conclusion that there is no implied interspousal immunity exception in
Title III.
4 5
II. THE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF TITLE III
A. The Plain Meaning of Title III
Congress intended Title III to be a forceful weapon in the war on organ-
ized crime.46 In enacting Title III, Congress balanced the needs of law en-
forcement against an individual's right to privacy and concluded that in
order for the police to effectively combat organized crime, court-approved
47
electronic surveillance must be an available resource. Congress, however,
intended to prohibit all other electronic surveillance unless there was a spe-
cific statutory exception.48 To make explicit the intended scope of Title III,
Congress enacted statutory provisions which state that "[e]xcept as other-
44. Id. at 1151 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. See infra parts II.A., B.
46. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,186-88, 209-19, 224-34 (1968), reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2245- 47, 2259-69, 2273-84 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also
Giordano, 416 U.S. at 514.
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1968) ("[T]he Attorney General... may authorize an appli-
cation to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for.., an order authorizing or approving
the interception of wire or oral communications .... ").
48. SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153 (not-
ing that Title III "delineat[es] on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under
which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized").
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wise specifically provided in this chapter," it is unlawful for any person to
"intentionally intercept"4 9 any "wire"50 or "oral" 51 communication without
the "consent ' 52 of one of the parties to the communication.53 There are
only six enumerated statutory exceptions54 found in Title III, none of which
directly, or even impliedly, authorizes or addresses nonconsensual inter-
spousal wiretapping. Consideration of the plain meaning of Title III there-
fore leads to the conclusion that there is no statutory exception for
interspousal electronic surveillance.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, some courts have found the result unsat-
isfactory and view the omission of an interspousal wiretapping exception as
49. As defined in Title III, " 'intercept' means the aural or other acquisition of the con-
tents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
50. A "wire communication" is defined in Title III as:
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the trans-
mission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection be-
tween the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in
providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
51. An" 'oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhib-
iting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under cir-
cumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic
communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
52. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), it is not "unlawful" for a person to intercept a
wire or oral communication when one of the parties to the communication has "given prior
consent to such interception." Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). Section 2511(l)(a) states, in pertinent part, that: "[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who--... intentionally intercepts,
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire, oral, or electronic communication ... [shall be subject to criminal and civil penalties]."
Id. Title III provides penalties of up to five years in prison, see 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(4)(a), and
also provides that in a civil lawsuit, a person may recover actual damages, punitive damages,
"reasonable attorney's fee[s] and other litigation costs reasonably incurred." 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
54. Exceptions are provided for: (1) switchboard operators and employees of providers of
wire and electronic communication services, who "in the normal course of [their] employ-
ment" intercept communications while engaged in activities incidental to their employment, or
intercept communications to protect the property rights of the provider of the service, or pro-
vide assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept communications, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 251 1(2)(a)(i)-(ii); (2) employees of the Federal Communications Commission who "in the
normal course of [their] employment" intercept communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b);
(3) persons acting under color of law who intercept communications, "where such person is a
party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception," 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(1)(c); (4) persons who consent to the interception of
their communications, or one of the parties to the communication [who] has given prior "con-
sent to such interception," 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(d); (5) agents of the United States who conduct
government foreign intelligence activities, 18 US.C. §§ 2511(1)(e)-(1)(O; and (6) persons who
intercept communications through the use of extension telephone being used "in the ordinary
course of business." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a).
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puzzling, in light of the fact that Congress was aware of widespread elec-
tronic surveillance in domestic relations cases." Thus, the question that the
federal courts of appeals and the federal district courts have grappled with
is: what did Congress intend with respect to interspousal electronic
surveillance?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was the first
federal circuit court of appeals to address this issue in Simpson v. Simpson.56
In Simpson, the plaintiff sought to maintain a civil cause of action for dam-
ages based upon alleged unlawful electronic surveillance conducted by her
spouse." The court conceded that the "naked language" of the statute "by
virtue of its inconclusiveness, reaches this case.""8 However, the court chose
to examine the legislative history of Title III because of the potentially "far-
reaching result" in an area that Congress "normally left to the states."
59
After conducting what it characterized as a "long, exhaustive, and inconclu-
sive" search of the legislative history,6 ° the court concluded that Congress
did not intend to encompass a prohibition against interspousal electronic
surveillance in Title 111.61 The Simpson court opined that "Congress did not
intend such a far-reaching result [and that Congress did not demonstrate] its
positive intent to reach so far [into the privacy of the marital relationship] or
an awareness that it might be doing so. ' '62 Although the court expressed
some "doubts" about the correctness of its decision, the Fifth Circuit held
that a civil cause of action for monetary damages could not be maintained
for interspousal wiretapping.
63
Three years later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Simpson and reached a similar conclusion in
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 6' a case focusing on the "telephone extension"
exception. 65 The case involved a husband who had recorded telephone con-
55. See infra notes 81-122 and accompanying text.
56. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
57. Id. at 809.
58. Id. at 805.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 806.
61. Id. at 809.
62. Id. at 805-06.
63. Id. at 810. In a subsequent decision, the Fifth Circuit expressed doubt about the
decision it reached in Simpson, and refused to apply its reasoning to a different, albeit similar,
set of facts. See United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848, 850 (5th Cir. 1974) (refusing to
apply the interspousal immunity doctrine to a defendant who had a relationship with, but was
not married to, the woman whose telephone conversations he intercepted).
64. 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
65. The telephone extension exception derives from the definitions of several words. The
prohibited conduct under Title III is the interception of oral and wire communications. See
supra note 53. "'Intercept' means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
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versations between his wife and daughter.66 The court found that Congress
did not intend to provide a civil cause of action for interspousal electronic
surveillance when the interception took place over an extension telephone
located within the home.67 The court reasoned that since there would be no
violation of the law if the activity "consisted merely of listening ... [to the]
telephone conversations from an extension phone,' 6 1 the conduct was not
unlawful since the taped conversations were obtained from a "telephone an-
swering machine .. . [which was] plugged into the standard Telephone
Company jack."
69
In the past two decades, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Simpson has been
severely criticized by four other federal appellate courts: the Fourth Circuit
in Pritchard v. Pritchard,7 ° the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Jones,7 1 the
Eighth Circuit in Kempf v. Kempf,72 and the Tenth Circuit in Heggy v.
Heggy.73 Several federal district courts74 have also declined to follow the
Simpson reasoning. These courts, after analyzing the plain meaning of Title
III and its legislative history, have concluded that in the absence of a specific
statutory exception for interspousal electronic surveillance in Title III, they
could not and would not create an implied exception by judicial fiat. The
judicial disagreement over the intended scope of Title III makes apparent
the need to reexamine the legislative history of the statute to determine
whether the plain meaning of Title III should be "trumped" by contradic-
device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1968). "Electronic, mechanical, or other device" is defined as
"any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion other than" an extension telephone used "in the ordinary course of... business." 18
U.S.C. § 2510(5).
66. Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679.
67. Id. at 678-79.
68. Id. at 678. In addition to misreading the legislative history of Title III, see infra notes
77-122 and accompanying text, the Second Circuit's decision in Anonymous was flawed be-
cause the telephone extension exception should never apply in situations where the listening
device that is used is capable of secretly monitoring all incoming and outgoing telephone calls
without the consent of one of the parties to the conversation, because such a device would not
be used "in the ordinary course of business." United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 673 n.24
(6th Cir. 1976); see United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974).
69. Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 678-79. The Second Circuit also found dispositive a portion
of the legislative history originally cited by the Simpson court. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490
F.2d 803, 809 n.17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). Professor Herman Schwartz,
of the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, testifying before Congress
regarding the proposed telephone extension provision, stated, "I take it nobody wants to make
it a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage daughter or some such related problem." Anti-
Crime Program: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 901, 989 (1967) [hereinafter Anti-Crime Hearings]
70. 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
71. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
72. 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989).
73. 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
74. See supra note 9.
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tory legislative history, to prevent a result "demonstrably at odds with the
intention of the drafters."
75
B. The Legislative History of Title III
Prior to the passage of Title III, the Federal Communications Act of
193476 governed the interception of communications by law enforcement of-
ficers and private individuals. The acknowledgement by many of the insuffi-
ciency of the 1934 Act was an important factor motivating Congress to pass
Title III. 77 During the consideration of several predecessor bills which ulti-
mately evolved into Title III, Congress debated how to improve the 1934
Act to "effectively" protect individual privacy. 78 As expressed by Senator
Edward Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Congress sought
to "fill[ ] the gaps and plug[ ] the loopholes of existing law."' 79 At no time
during the Congressional debate over the issue, however, was there a call to
narrow the scope of the 1934 Act. Nor was any member critical on the
record of the judicial determination that the 1934 Act prohibited electronic
surveillance in domestic relations cases."0
Beginning in 1965, Congress conducted many hearings on the invasion of
privacy where the widespread use of wiretapping in marital disputes was
clearly noted."' For example, Subcommittee Chairman, Senator Long, in-
75. United States v. Ron Pair Enters, 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989) (quoting Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)); see infra notes 20-23 and accompanying
text.
76. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934) ("No person . .. shall divulge or publish the existence, con-
tents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of [any intercepted wire communication].").
77. See e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 67, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2154 (" 'The present status of the law (relating to wiretapping and electronic surveillance) is
intolerable.' ") (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202-03 (1967)).
78. Congress made a number of findings with respect to Title III. One of those findings
stated that Title III was passed "[iun order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral
communications." Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 801, 82 Stat. 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521)(1968)).
79. The Right of Privacy Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 928 Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 4
(1967) [hereinafter 1967 Right of Privacy Act Hearings].
80. United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1957). Indeed, Gris was cited with
approval in the Final Senate Report. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 100.
81. Numerous hearings were conducted between 1965 and 1968 on legislativ6 predeces-
sors to Title III. See, e.g., 1967 Right of Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 79; Anti-Crime
Hearings, supra note 69; Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Criminal Laws and Procedures: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Invasions of Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac-
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troduced into the record at one hearing an article written by Arthur Whit-
man entitled "Is Big Brother Taping You?"' 8 2 In pertinent part, the article
stated that "[i]ndividuals involved in civil suits bug each others' premises to
gather useful information and evidence. The prime area for this is divorce
actions .... So little is sacred in this line of endeavor that bugs routinely are
discovered under the beds of estranged husbands and wives." 8 3
Further evidence that Congress was aware of the prevalence of electronic
surveillance in domestic relations cases was provided by the testimony of
Richard Gerstein, District Attorney for Dade County, Florida. Mr. Ger-
stein stated that "it is routine procedure in marital disagreements and other
civil disputes for private detective agencies, generally with full knowledge of
the lawyers, to tap telephones."8 4 Two private detectives, Bernard Spindel
and John Leon, corroborated Mr. Gerstein's testimony, stating that wiretap-
ping was common in domestic relations investigations.8" Following the
presentation of all the evidence, Senator Long concluded that "[t]he three
large areas of snooping in [the] field [of non-governmental electronic surveil-
lance] are (1) industrial, (2) divorce cases, and (3) politics."8 6
Following these hearings, a number of bills were introduced in the Senate
which were intended to prohibit electronic surveillance by law enforcement
officers and private individuals. In 1967, the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary rejected these bills in favor of a bill entitled the "Right of Privacy Act
of 1967. 987 This legislation was, with one significant difference, the same as
the provision which Congress ultimately enacted into law as 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511.8 Under the "Right of Privacy Act of 1967," electronic surveillance
would have been prohibited only when it involved interstate commerce or
occurred in a location where the United States exercised local law enforce-
ment jurisdiction, 9 such as the District of Columbia and other federal en-
tice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-6 (1965-
1966) [hereinafter Invasions of Privacy Hearings]; Invasion of Privacy: Special Inquiry Before
the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the House Gov't Operations Comm., 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); see also Wiretapping-the Attorney General's Program: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
82. Invasions of Privacy Hearings, supra note 81, pt. 1, at 18.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id., pt. 2, at 1009 (emphasis added) (statement of Richard E. Gerstein, District Attor-
ney, Dade County, Fla.).
85. Id., pt. 5 at 2409-11 (Statement of John W. Leon, a private investigator); id. at 2262
(Statement of Bernard B. Spindel, an electronic technician specializing in eavesdropping).
86. Id. at 2261 (emphasis added) (Statement of Sen. Long).
87. S. 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 2887 (1967).
88. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
89. See Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States Defined, 18
U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
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claves. Absent such a nexus, federal jurisdiction over the conduct would not
have existed under the "Right of Privacy Act of 1967."
Robert Blakey, then a Professor of Law at Cornell University,9  testified
during the hearings which were held on the "Right of Privacy Act of 1967."
Professor Blakey had served as a special consultant to the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. In that
capacity, he had prepared a draft statute which was designed to govern elec-
tronic surveillance. 9 ' During his testimony, Professor Blakey explained that
"private bugging in this country can be divided into two broad categories,
commercial espionage and marital litigation."92 Professor Blakey then indi-
cated, both in the course of his testimony and in his prepared statement, that
he believed that the proposed statute was correct in attempting to prohibit
electronic surveillance in these areas.9 3 He described the private use of elec-
tronic surveillance techniques as "an abomination in a free society," 94 and
stated that "now is the time to take effective action to outlaw them." 95
Although Professor Blakey praised the proposed bill and concluded that it
would prohibit commercial espionage eavesdropping,96 the majority of
which occurs between businesses involved in interstate commerce, he be-
lieved that a fatal weakness existed in the bill. In Professor Blakey's opinion,
this deficiency was linked to the bill's dependence on the interstate com-
merce clause for its jurisdictional nexus. Although commercial espionage
typically occurs in the context of interstate commerce, Professor Blakey
noted that this relationship was not typical in domestic relations situations.97
Professor Blakey stated that:
this [interstate character of commercial espionage] is not true in
the domestic relations investigation, which involves, moreover, a far
more objectionable invasion of privacy [than commercial espio-
nage]. It is, of course, one thing to overhear a business secret; it is
a wholly different matter, however, to place under surveillance the
marital relationship. Electronic surveillance by a private individ-
ual in another's bedroom cuts most sharply against the grain.
90. See 1967 Right of Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 79, pt. 2, at 413 (testimony of G.
Robert Blakey); id. at 441 (prepared statement of G. Robert Blakey). Professor Blakey is
currently the Robert J. and Dorothy O'Neill Professor of Law at the Notre Dame Law School.
91. See G. Robert Blakey & James A. Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveillance Con-
trolAct, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 657 (1968). Professor Blakey has been publicly credited as
the "author" of Title III. See infra note 113.
92. 1967 Right of Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 79, pt. 2, at 413 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 441-43.
93. Id. at 441.
94. Id. at 443.
95. Id. at 443.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 442.
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But few, if any, of these investigations ever touch interstate
commerce.
98
To remedy this flaw, Professor Blakey suggested that Congress declare
that "all electronic surveillance aimed at [obtaining evidence for use in] mar-
ital litigation was criminal." 99 Professor Blakey testified that because most
marital litigation results in a court order, Congress could declare that any
order that is based "directly or indirectly" on electronic surveillance violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." ° He also stated that
under the Necessary and Proper Clause,' 0 ' Congress could outlaw all do-
mestic relations surveillance since no one could distinguish at the inception
between surveillance that would result in a court order and surveillance that
would not. 10 2 Accordingly, Professor Blakey recommended that Congress
reject the "Right of Privacy Act of 1967" and, instead, enact his own draft
bill. 1 3 According to Professor Blakey, his draft statute corrected the weak-
nesses in the "Right of Privacy Act of 1967" by providing a complete ban on
all electronic surveillance, including electronic surveillance in domestic rela-
tions cases."o
Approximately one year later, President Johnson signed Title III into law.
Title III was an amalgam of the House and Senate versions of the bill that
had been pending in Congress. The House version of Title III, House Bill
13,275,' was introduced on October 3, 1967.106 The Senate version of Ti-
tle III, Senate Bill 917, was a "combination"' 1 7 of Senate Bill 675,108 the
Federal Wire Interception Act, introduced by Senator McClellan for himself
98. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 413 (stating that "the statute, as it is presently
drafted, will not reach ... an attempt to use electronic equipment in the invasion of privacy of
the home and, particularly, the marital relationship") (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 413 (emphasis added); see id. at 442-43.
100. U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 1 (providing in pertinent part that no "state [shall] de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law").
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18 ("Congress shall have Power To... make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [its enumerated powers].").
102. 1967 Right of Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 79, pt.2, at 413 (testimony of Professor
Blakey) (commenting that "since [Congress] could not distinguish between the 'good' elec-
tronic surveillance and the 'bad' electronic surveillance, [Congress] might be able to outlaw it
all").
103. Id. at 445, 452; see Blakey & Hancock, supra note 91.
104. 1967 Right of Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 79, pt.2, at 413 (testimony of Professor
Blakey) (commenting that "[The Right of Privacy Act of 1967] will not reach ... an attempt
to use electronic equipment in the invasion of the home and, particularly, the marital
relationship").
105. 113 CONG. REC. 27,718 (1967).
106. H.R. 13,275, 90th Cong., 1st Sess, 113 CONG. REC. 27,718 (1967).
107. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153.
108. S. 675, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 1491 (1967).
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and Senator Hruska on January 25, 1967, °9 and Senate Bill 2050,1 ° the
Electronic Surveillance Control Act of 1967, which was introduced by Sena-
tor Hruska for himself and Senator McClellen on June 29, 1967.111 Indeed,
House Bill 13,275 was the same draft statute that Professor Blakey had rec-
ommended as a substitution for the "Right of Privacy Act of 1967."' 12 The
Senate bill was also based on Professor Blakey's work because it incorpo-
rated the recommendations of the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice, to which Professor Blakey was a
special consultant. As a result, the Senate bill's prohibitions against private
electronic surveillance were essentially the same as the House bill, which was
the Blakey bill."'
Thus, the only fundamental difference between the predecessor bill and
the version of Title III that President Johnson signed into law was the lat-
ter's broad prohibition on wiretapping, which was specifically designed to
close the gap caused by the former's failure to prohibit electronic surveil-
lance in domestic relations situations. Professor Blakey's testimony, coupled
with the Senate Judiciary Committee's decision to choose the language of the
Blakey bill when faced with a choice between the two proposals,1 4 persua-
sively demonstrates the Committee's desire to apply the law in domestic re-
lations situations.
An examination of the statements made by the bill's sponsors and other
senators provides additional evidence of Congress' intent. The legislators
made it clear that wiretapping and eavesdropping in marital disputes was
pervasive and would now be prohibited under the new Title III legislation.
For example, Senator Thurmond noted that his views on the bill were con-
tained in a joint statement with Senators Hruska, Dirksen, and Scott, which
indicated that Title III would apply to domestic relations cases." 5 Senator
Hruska, one of the bill's two co-sponsors, stated that the legislation imposes
"[a] broad prohibition ... on private use of electronic surveillance, particu-
109. Id.
110. S. 2050, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 18,007 (1967).
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 90-103.
113. Both the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit have described Professor Blakey as the "author" of Title III. See United States
v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 517 n.7 (1974); United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 197 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1973).
114. Professor Blakey was present in the Senate and conferred with Senator McClellan, a
co-sponsor of Title III, during the Senate floor debate. 114 CONG. REC. 14,473 (1968) ("Pro-
fessor Blakey is in the Chamber and is conferring with the Senator from Arkansas.").
115. 114 CONG. REC. 11,611 (1968); id. at 11,613. This joint statement was included in the




larly in domestic relations and industrial espionage situations.""' 6 Senator
Scott also stated that the legislation prohibits surveillance by "all private
persons and by public officials unless they demonstrate a compelling law-
enforcement need.""' Senator Mundt stated that:
[e]veryone agrees that private wiretapping or eavesdropping should
be prohibited. It is repugnant to our way of life. And yet it has
grown substantially in the last few years .... Domestic relations,
industrial espionage, and counterespionage, information obtained
for civil litigation are all fertile fields for those who traffic in other
people's privacy. Title III takes care of this by making it a crime
to intercept communications without the consent of one of the
participants."'
Senator Tydings stated that: "as the law stands today,... [a]ll of our pri-
vate eyes, our economic detectives, our snoopers, can tap with impunity any-
body's wire, on any action from a domestic relations case to a real estate
operator or a major manufacturing concern .... Title III corrects this situa-
tion. '"  Senator McClellan, the other co-sponsor of Title III, stated that
"[tlo assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, title III prohibits
all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly au-
thorized law enforcement officers."'
120
These statements and the statements of other members of Congress show
that a unified Congress 12 intentionally chose the language of the Blakey bill
116. SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 225, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2274 (em-
phasis added).
117. 114 CONG. REC. 13,200 (1968) (emphasis added). Senator Hruska also introduced an
article into the Congressional Record by Senator Scott which stated, in pertinent part, that
under the proposed legislation, the "[p]rivate utilization of wiretapping and bugging would be
flatly prohibited." 114 CONG. REC. 2950 (1968). Notably, the United States Supreme Court
has also chosen this language to describe the scope of Title III. Gelbard v. United States, 408
U.S. 41, 46 (1972) (explaining that all oral and wire interceptions are "flatly prohibited"); see
also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974) (stating that Title III was passed to
"effectively .. .prohibit .. .all interceptions of oral and wire communications, except those
specifically provided for in the Act").
118. 114 CONG. REC. 14,747 (emphasis added).
119. 114 CONG. REC. 14,480 (emphasis added); see also 114 CONG. REC. 14,695; 114
CONG. REC. 14,732.
120. 114 CONG. REC. 14,469 (emphasis added).
121. Senator Percy summarized the views of his colleagues when he stated: "Mr. Presi-
dent, the provisions of the bill banning private surveillance enjoy widespread if not complete
support of this body." 114 CONG. REC. 14,762; see also 114 CONG. REC. 14,724 (statement of
Sen. Cooper) (Title III provides "strict penalties against persons who do not follow the desig-
nated procedure to secure a proper order for the authority to intercept a communication by
wire or radio, or an oral communication"); 114 CONG. REC. 16,286 (statement of Rep.
Machen) (Title III "makes unauthorized wiretapping or bugging a Federal crime"); 114
CONG. REC. 14,471 (statement of Sen. Long) ("the pending bill would prohibit all private
third party wiretapping"); 114 CONG. REC. 14,701 (statement of Sen. Long) (Title III would
prohibit electronic surveillance from all "private persons"). Senator Long also read a report
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over that of the "Right of Privacy Act of 1967," and that it did so to ensure
inclusion of domestic relations cases within the scope of prohibited conduct
governed by Title III. Additionally, the final Senate Report accompanying
Title III contains numerous statements' 2 2 that Title III was intended to im-
pose a complete ban on the interception of wire and oral communications,' 2 3
except as specifically provided.
After the enactment of Title III, Congress established the National Com-
mission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance. The Commission's function was to study and
review the effectiveness of Title III during the six-year period following its
enactment. 124 Professor Blakey was appointed to serve on the Commis-
sion. 125  The appointment provided the rare opportunity to learn the
thoughts of the statute's author 126 years after its enactment. Professor
Blakey characterized domestic relations interceptions as "one of the most
vicious invasions of privacy, not business secrets but literally the intimacies
of personal relations," 127 and he believed that such interceptions were in
direct contravention of Title III. Accordingly, Professor Blakey severely
into the record by the New York Bar Association which compared the "Blakey bill," which
"imposes a blanket ban on all wiretapping and eavesdropping by private parties," with other
pending legislation. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,476.
122. SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 27, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2113 ("Title
III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized
law enforcement officials engaged in the investigation of specified types of major crimes after
obtaining a court order .... "); id. at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153 ("To assure
the privacy of oral and wire communications, title III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic
surveillance [except as authorized] .. "); id. at 89, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177
("[AII unauthorized interceptions of [wire and oral] communications should be prohibited
.... '); id. at 91, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2180 ("Section 2511 of the new chapter
prohibits, except as otherwise specifically provided in the chapter itself, the interception and
disclosure of all wire or oral communications."); id. at 91, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2179 ("[T]he definition [of a person] is intended to be comprehensive."); id. at 91, reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2180 (Section 2511 "establishes a blanket prohibition against the inter-
ception of any wire communication"); id. at 225, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2274 ("A
broad prohibition is imposed on private use of electronic surveillance, particulary in domestic
relations and industrial espionage situations.")
123. President Johnson, upon signing the law, issued a statement in which he said that he
had urged Congress to "outlaw all wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, public and pri-
vate, wherever and whenever it occurs." N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1968, at 23.
124. Commission Hearings, National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws
Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, 2 (1976) [hereinafter NWC Comm'n
Hearings] ("It ... is now the active mandate of this Commission to review and evaluate the
effectiveness of th[e] [Omnibus Crime Control Act, Title III] legislation.").
125. Id. at iii.
126. See supra note 113.
127. 2 NWC Comm'n Hearings, supra note 124, at 1112; see also William J. Holt, Com-
ment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 185, 204 n.85 (1975).
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criticized the Fifth Circuit's decision in Simpson v. Simpson,128 stating that
he could not understand how the court "could have read ... [interspousal
immunity] into the statute. "129
Based upon a review of the entire legislative history of Title III, including
Professor Blakey's oral and written testimony, there is no question that the
Fifth Circuit wrongly decided the Simpson case. The Fifth Circuit's failure
in Simpson to discover key passages in the relevant legislative history caused
this error. This is evidenced by the court's statement that while there were
''occasional references to the fact that the bill would prohibit private use of
electronic surveillance techniques, there are no substantive discussions of the
probable or desired reach of the prohibitions."' 3° If the Fifth Circuit had
discovered all of the statements in the final Senate Report and the other
portions of the legislative history referenced above, which clearly demon-
strate that Congress intended Title III to apply in domestic relations situa-
128. 2 NWC Comm'n Hearings, supra note 124, at 1111; see supra notes 56-63 and accom-
panying text.
129. 2 NWC Comm'n Hearings, supra note 124, at 1111. Testimony before the Wiretap
Commission also underscored the impact of the Simpson decision upon the ability of the Jus-
tice Department to prosecute Title III violations since the statute required the government to
prove a "willful" interception. NWC REPORT, supra note 6, at 166-71. Unfortunately, the
term "willful" was construed and misconstrued by the courts due to the reference to United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933), in the final Senate Report. See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 46, at 93, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2181 ("A violation of each must be
willful to be criminal (United States v. Murdock .... 290 U.S. 389 (1933))."). The House of
Representatives acknowledged this judicial inconsistency when it sought to amend Title III in
1986. See H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 48 (1986). The House Report
indicates that "the Committee intends that the term [willful] have the same meaning as the
term intentional." Id. When the Senate considered the bill, the legislators specifically changed
the mens rea requirement from "willful" to "intentional." 132 CONG. REC. 27,633 (1986)
(statement of Sen. Leahy). As a result of the passage of The Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101(f), 100 Stat. 1853, the government is required to
prove only that the defendant's act was "intentional." See S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S. C.C.A.N. at 3555, 3577. Thus, while persons charged
with violating Title III may still assert a defense based upon an "accidental" interception or a
mistake of fact, see id. at 25, reliance upon Simpson to provide a mistake of law defense is no
longer available. See Fultz v. Gilliam, 942 F.2d 396, 404 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting defendant's
ignorance of the law defense); accord Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1542 (10th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
130. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 807 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974) (footnote omitted). The legislative history discovered by the Simpson court was set
forth in a footnote of the court's opinion. Id. at 808 n. 14. The court stated: "[o]ur independ-
ent search of legislative materials has been long, exhaustive, and inconclusive .... [W]e have
found no direct indications that Congress intended [that Title III apply to the marital home]."
Id. at 806.
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tions, it is certain that the court, which had "doubts"' 13 1 about its decision,
would have reached a different conclusion. 132
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Interspousal Immunity Doctrine: Anachronistic and Misapplied
The common law doctrine of interspousal immunity originated in the
early 1800s, when marriage had different social and religious implications
than it does today. A husband and wife were perceived as one-the man.
133
During this period, a married woman had no independent right to sue and
could not be sued, as such legal rights were reserved for the man. 134 Mar-
riage was considered a lifetime proposition, and a husband was legally re-
sponsible for his wife's misbehavior in a court of law. 135 Consequently, since
a marriage had a singular, as opposed to a dual identity, it was impossible for
spouses to sue each other since the husband obviously could not sue
himself.'
3 6
As women became emancipated over the years, the roles and societal per-
ception of women and of marriage changed. In addition, pursuant to the
passage of the Married Women's Property Act in every state and the District
of Columbia, married women were given the right to sue and be sued in their
131. Id. at 810.
132. Leading commentators on the law of electronic surveillance have also concluded that
the Simpson decision "misreads the legislative history and purpose of Title III." JAMES G.
CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, § 8.05(2)(c), at 499 (1977); see JAMES G.
CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, § 3.6, at 3-109 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter
CARR (2d ed.)] ("Courts [like the Simpson court] which allow one spouse to eavesdrop elec-
tronically on the other ... misread the legislative history of Title III."); CLIFFORD S. FISH-
MAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 8, at 119 (Supp. 1991) (commenting that the
"prevailing, and correct view, is that it is unlawful for one spouse to tap the marital phone to
acquire evidence against the other spouse"); id. § 25.1, at 203 ("[lIt is clear from the language
and history of Title III that Congress intended no such [interspousal immunity] exception.").
Even Professor Herman Schwartz, of the State University of New York at Buffalo School of
Law, whose comments about the telephone extension exception were misconstrued by the
Fifth Circuit in Simpson, see 490 F.2d at 809 n. 17; supra note 69, has stated that the Simpson
decision was "not consistent" with the intent of the law. 2 NWC Comm'n Hearings, supra
note 124, at 1111 (commenting that the Simpson decision is "just not consistent with the
statute").
133. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 ("In marriage, husband and wife are
one person in law."); see WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at
859 (4th ed. 1971).
134. See, e.g., McCurdy, supra note 7.
135. See 2 FOWLER V. HARPER, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 8.10 (2d ed. 1986); Mc-
Curdy, supra note 7.
136. See Val Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956).
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own capacity, without joinder of their husbands.1 37 Thereafter, litigation
arose concerning whether interspousal lawsuits could be maintained.
Most courts upheld the interspousal immunity doctrine, concluding that
interspousal lawsuits could not be maintained.1 3' These courts justified their
recognition of the interspousal immunity doctrine by rationalizing that the
doctrine maintained domestic tranquility and avoided the potential for collu-
sion between spouses.139 These courts also concluded that interspousal law-
suits should not be maintained because of the availability of other remedies,
and articulated their concern that judicial intervention would threaten the
fabric of the marriage."
Today, however, the strength of the interspousal immunity doctrine has
weakened. 4 ' Courts more readily discard the notion that the institution of
marriage is a "sacred cow."' 4 2 If one spouse is secretly intercepting and
recording the private telephone conversations of the other spouse as a reac-
tion to the latter's perceived misdeeds, it is the spouses' conduct, not the
judiciary, which is threatening the fabric of the marriage.'
4 3
A second and perhaps more important reason for not recognizing the in-
terspousal immunity doctrine in the context of Title III is that the doctrine is
not, and never has been, a doctrine which applied in criminal cases. I" In
137. See PROSSER, supra note 133, § 122 at 861; CHESTER G. VERNIER, 3 AMERICAN
FAMILY LAWS §§ 167, 179-80 (1935 & Supp. 1938).
138. See, e.g., Adams v. Grogg, 116 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1969); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384
P.2d 389 (Utah 1963); Campbell v. Campbell, 114 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1960). See generally
Adler, supra note 7 (providing a detailed history of interspousal immunity developments in the
states).
139. See infra note 140.
140. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619 (1910) (suggesting that a wife
resort to bringing a criminal action, seeking a divorce or a separation or reporting to the
Chancery Court to recover damages for assault and battery by her husband); Mims v. Mims,
305 So. 2d 787, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (citing divorce proceedings as the proper forum
for the resolution of a claim of fraud for love and affection); Ensminger v. Ensminger, 77 So.
2d 308, 310 (Miss. 1955) (citing alternative forums of divorce and criminal courts but acknowl-
edging that neither is applicable in this case); see Dorian L. Rowe, Comment, Wiretapping and
the Modern Marriage: Does Title III Provide a Federal Remedy for Victims of Interspousal
Electronic Surveillance?, 91 DICK. L. REV. 855, 864-66 (1987) (identifying the arguments for
and against the interspousal immunity doctrine); Holt, supra note 127, at 191-97 (discussing
the arguments used to preserve the interspousal immunity doctrine in a jurisdiction where a
Married Woman Act had been enacted).
141. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 672 n.21 (6th Cir. 1976) ("The trend appears to
be toward abrogation of the doctrine."); see PROSSER, supra note 133, § 122 at 863-64; HOMER
H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, § 10.1 at 372-
73 (2d ed. 1988).
142. Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Holt, supra note 127, at 196.
143. See CARR (2d ed.), supra note 132, § 3.6 at 3-108; see also Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d
1537, 1541 n.8 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
144. Jones, 542 F.2d at 672.
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Simpson v. Simpson,145 the Fifth Circuit relied on a section of Professor
Prosser's text on torts. 14 6 Within the section cited by the Simpson court is a
statement that indicates that the courts that have upheld the interspousal
immunity doctrine have relied, in part, on the availability of alternative rem-
edies each spouse may have in criminal and divorce laws. 147 Thus, the inter-
spousal immunity doctrine should not bar a criminal prosecution, because it
owes its existence, in part, to the availability of criminal sanctions. 148 In-
deed, as the Sixth Circuit recognized in United States v. Jones, 14 "[e]ven in
states which recognize interspousal immunity, that immunity does not apply
to criminal prosecutions."' 0 Since Title III is a criminal statute,"'i the in-
terspousal immunity doctrine should not have been held applicable to Title
III. Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit has noted, "husbands and wives were
always regarded as separate individuals in criminal law,"' 2 which differs
radically from the earlier fused identity of husband and wife in contract and
tort actions, which gave rise to the interspousal immunity doctrine.15 3
A third reason for denying application of the interspousal immunity doc-
trine to Title III is that a state's law cannot supplant a cause of action cre-
ated by federal law. 154 Interspousal immunity is a creation of state law."'
Congress intended Title III to govern electronic surveillance, but never in-
tended the statute to regulate marital relations or concern itself with issues
relating to support or custody, all of which are issues governed by state
145. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); see supra notes 56-63 and
accompanying text.
146. Simpson, 490 F.2d at 806 n.7 (citing PROSSER, supra note 133, § 122 at 861-64).
147. PROSSER, supra note 133, § 122 at 862.
148. Jones, 542 F.2d at 672.
149. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
150. Id. at 672.
151. Even the Simpson court recognized this proposition. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d
803, 809 (5th Cir.); cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
152. Jones, 542 F.2d at 672 n.22.
153. Id. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue in the context of inter-
spousal electronic surveillance, the Supreme Court has continued to articulate its view that a
husband and wife have separate legal identities with respect to their individual privacy rights
in the marital relationship. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976)
("When the wife and the husband disagree on this decision [to terminate a pregnancy], the
view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) ("[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup."). See Rowe, supra note 140, at 881 ("Each spouse continues to possess an individ-
ual privacy interest after marriage which should remain free from all wrongful intrusions. The
personal right of privacy in one's bodily integrity differs only in degree from the personal right
of privacy in one's thoughts and conservations.").
154. See Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1541 n.8 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1514 (1992); see Jones, 541 F.2d at 672.
155. See, e.g., Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 431 N.E.2d 998 (Ohio 1982).
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law.' 56 To permit the invocation of a state-created doctrine to usurp the
overriding purpose of a federal statute would controvert the constitutional
principle that federal laws are supreme to those of the states.
157
B. Personal Privacy Considerations
From a personal privacy perspective, electronic surveillance clearly in-
vades a protected federal constitutional right.' 5 8 The original hearings
before Congress5 9 and the subsequent analysis completed by the Wiretap
Commission 6 ° showed that the preservation of privacy is of national con-
cern to the American public. Indeed, as one study revealed, three out of
four Americans equate the preservation of privacy with the inalienable right
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.16 ' The presence of a wiretapping
device which can automatically, and with a "minimum of human supervi-
sion"' 6 2 record all incoming and outgoing telephone calls, invades more
than the privacy of the spouse who is the victim of the electronic surveil-
lance: it invades the privacy of all persons who talk on that telephone.'6 3
The "evil" of wiretapping, as Justice Brandeis described in his dissenting
opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 164 is the invasion of the constitutional
right of privacy, which is exacerbated by the installation of even an unso-
phisticated eavesdropping device purchased at a local electronics store.
The legislative solution to the evil of wiretapping is embodied in Title III.
Congress articulated its objectives regarding Title III in the final Senate Re-
port when it stated that:
156. See Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
157. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "the
Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... [the] Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
158. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (1977) (stating that the right
of privacy is an individual's "right to be left alone.")
159. See supra note 81.
160. See supra note 124.
161. ALAN F. WESTIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: A NATIONAL OPINION RE-
SEARCH SURVEY OF ATrITUDES TOWARD PRIVACY 5 (1979).
162. Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (quoting Holt, supra note 127,
at 205-06; People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178, 1190 (Cal. 1992) (commenting that a wiretap device
"is of potentially unlimited duration, and is wholly indiscriminate").
163. An "aggrieved person" means any "person who was a party to any intercepted wire,
oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1968); cf. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that the interception of all incoming and outgoing telephone calls "invaded the pri-
vacy of innumerable persons, known and unknown").
164. 277 U.S. 438, 475-76 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The reasoning has now been
accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967);
Katz v. New York, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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[a]ll too often the invasion of privacy itself will go unknown. Only
by striking at all aspects of the problem can privacy be adequately
protected. The prohibition, too, must be enforced with all appro-
priate sanctions. Criminal penalties have their part to play. But
other remedies must be afforded the victim of an unlawful invasion
of privacy. Provision must be made for civil recourse for damages.
The perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in
civil and criminal proceedings. Each of these objectives is sought
by the proposed legislation. 165
Indeed, Congress was extremely concerned with the invasion of privacy
and sought to provide both criminal and civil penalties for illegal electronic
surveillance. 166 In addition, Congress sought to ensure that the initial inva-
sion of privacy would not be compounded by the subsequent disclosure and
use of the illegally intercepted communications. 167 As part of the broad ar-
ray of protections against the invasion of privacy, Congress enacted a statu-
tory exclusionary rule' 68 to enforce the limitations imposed by Title III upon
wiretapping and electronic surveillance, 1 69 as well as separate disclosure 7 °
and use' 7 ' provisions.
165. SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2156.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see Fultz v. Gilliam, 942 F.2d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 1991) (The separate use and
disclosure provisions "insure protection for the wiretap victim from third parties, unrelated to
the wrongdoer, who, having access to the material and a reasonable basis to know its source,
might desire to disclose the information for their own purposes.").
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1968). Section 2515 provides that:
(w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received
in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other
authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if disclosure
of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
Id.; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 96, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.
("[Section 2515] forms an integral part of the system of limitations and is designed to protect
privacy. Along with the criminal and civil remedies, it should serve to guarantee that the
standards of the new chapter will sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and oral
communications.").
169. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1972).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(c). Section 2511(l)(c) provides criminal and civil penalties for
any person who "intentionally discloses, endeavors to disclose, to any other person the con-
tents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that
the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communi-
cation in violation of this subsection." Id.; see, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 602 F.2d
1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d). Section 2511(l)(d) provides criminal and civil penalties for
any person who "intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was ob-
tained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this




Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is
"straightforward and comprehensive."172 It provides criminal and civil pen-
alties when there is an intentional interception of a telephone conversation
without the consent of one of the parties to the conversation. Even without
examining the legislative history of Title III, it is clear from the plain mean-
ing of the text of the statute that Title III does not provide a specific excep-
tion that would permit one spouse to intentionally intercept and record the
private telephone conversations of the other spouse.
There can be no doubt that Congress was aware of the degree to which
wiretapping occurred in domestic relations situations and specifically re-
jected a predecessor bill to Title III because it failed to prohibit electronic
surveillance in such cases. Congress intended Title III to be a "blanket pro-
hibition"' against all electronic surveillance unless a "specific" statutory
exception applied. Whatever remaining validity the interspousal immunity
doctrine may have in other contexts, it is not applicable to Title III.
Carving out an interspousal immunity exception in Title III is simply ex-
tralegal policy-making by the judiciary-indeed, bad policy-that has
neither been approved by Congress nor presented to the President for his
signature. 174 When one spouse talks on the telephone, the other spouse has
no legal right to secretly intercept and record those private telephone con-
versations, even if he or she is paying the telephone bill.
172. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 666 (6th Cir. 1976).
173. SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 91-92, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2181; see
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46
(1972).
174. Article I of the Constitution provides that legislation is not valid unless it has been
passed by both the House and the Senate and presented to the President, usually for his signa-
ture. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 cl. 2; see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 950-51 (1983).
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